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Abstract—HTTP response size is a well-known side channel
attack. With the deployment of HTTP/2.0, response size attacks
are generally dismissed with the argument that pipelining and
response multiplexing prevent eavesdroppers from finding out
response sizes. Yet the extent to which pipelining and response
multiplexing actually hide HTTP response sizes has not been ad-
equately investigated. In this paper we set out to help understand
the effect of pipelining in hiding the size of web objects on the
Internet. We conduct an experiment that provides browser-side
HTTP response sizes and network-captured TLS record sizes and
show how the model that we propose for estimating response sizes
from TLS record sizes improves response matching and attack
performance. In this process we gather evidence on how different
implementations of HTTP/2.0 web servers generate different side-
channel information and the limited amount of pipelining and
response multiplexing used on the Internet today.
I. INTRODUCTION
HTTP with TLS encryption prevents attacks that inspect
HTTP payload and signaling. HTTP response size analysis is
a well-known side-channel attack [1] that overcomes encrypted
payload inspection by using eavesdropped sizes of web objects
to identify web applications. Up to HTTP/1.1, the web client
typically waits for the response to the current HTTP request
before issuing the next request, making it straightforward to
find the size of HTTP responses by tapping into the TCP/IP
connection. With the deployment of HTTP/2.0 [2] and its
pipelining and multiplexing mechanisms, most authors assume
HTTP response size analysis attacks can be prevented. With
request pipelining, clients no longer need to wait for the
response to the current HTTP request to issue the next request.
With response multiplexing, servers no longer need to wait for
the current response to be finished to send the next response.
Distinguishing web object sizes by eavesdropping TLS record
sizes should thus be unfeasible.
Yet the extent to which pipelining and multiplexing actually
hide HTTP response sizes on the Web has not been adequately
investigated. The fact that these mechanisms exist and are
deployed does not mean that they are used and that they are
effective in hiding response sizes. Web content from a web
page is often not pulled from the server at once and, if it is,
HTTP signaling information may leak through TLS to help the
attacker. This means that the privacy of regular web site users
who will not have any particular reason for using anonymity
tools like Tor [3] may be more at risk than what is believed
and that the transition to HTTP/2.0 alone may not fully prevent
this risk. This is especially relevant for the growing amount of
traffic that goes through proxies and content delivery networks
that share IP addresses between applications and for which a
simple IP database lookup would not suffice for identifying
web sites and applications.
In this paper we set out to help understand the effect of
pipelining in hiding the size of web objects. The basis for this
work is a set of HTTPS requests to the first 5k of Alexa’s top
1M web site pages [4]. For each web site page we collect a
tcpdump capture for all incoming and outgoing traffic through
the client’s Ethernet interface and the HAR [5] log of HTTP
requests and their responses as recorded by the browser. We
use tcpdump 4.5.1, tshark 14.04, and Firefox 45.0.1 on Ubuntu
14.04 desktop Linux with Selenium python webdriver 2.53.1
and haralyzer 1.4.10 suites. We then extract TLS record sizes
and estimate HTTP response sizes assuming 1) keep-alive,
persistent TCP connections and 2) pipelining and multiplexing
with unique TLS size response separator and distinct TLS
record sizes for HTTP/2.0 response headers. Finally we match
the estimated response sizes to the browser HAR response
sizes and obtain HAR-TLS response size match results.
In the rest of this paper we start by characterizing the HAR
data set that resulted from our Alexa’s web site page requests.
Then we describe in more detail our approach to estimate
HTTP/2.0 response sizes from TLS records. HTTP/2.0 web
servers pack HTTP responses differently and choose to focus
on the type of web servers with most TCP connections. For
these web servers we characterize our estimated HTTP/2.0
response sizes, describe the HAR-TLS estimated response size
match results, and show the impact of pipelining in these
results.
II. COLLECTED DATA SET
Each of the 5k Alexa’s web site names was prepended
with the "https://" prefix and this URL loaded into Firefox
using Selenium’s webdriver suite. The browser was only able
to open 72% of the web site URLs. The remaining web
sites were either not active or not responding to HTTPS
requests. Each web page site that responded with HTML and
browser-side scripts triggers the browser to issue additional
requests that are then rendered on the browser along side the
main web site content. We analyzed HAR logs and found
that we had recorded 328k responses: 51% HTTPS and 18%
HTTP/2.0. We also found that less than 17% web sites received
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only HTTPS additional responses, which means that for 83%
web sites part of the content that is rendered to the user
is vulnerable to payload inspection attacks. Less then 7%
web sites received only HTTP/2.0 additional responses, which
means that for 10% we sites part of the content that is rendered
to the user is vulnerable to directly observable response size
side-channel attacks.
These numbers tell us that we should be concerned firstly
about the 83% web sites for which part of their rendered
content is vulnerable to payload inspection, and secondly about
the 10% web sites for which part of their rendered content is
vulnerable to directly observable response size side-channel
attacks. In this paper we assume that the trend of increased
use of HTTPS and HTTP/2.0 will continue [2] and that this
will address the two concerns above. Consequently we focus
on HTTP/2.0 and its ability to deter response size side-channel
attacks.
Additional web site requests in our data set are often served
by the same web server. It is thus possible to characterize
individual web servers according to their use of HTTPS and
HTTP/2.0. Here we define a web server as a 3-tuple (IP,
port number, protocol) where IP is the web server
IP address, port is the TCP/IP port number (80 or 443),
and protocol is either HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2.0. We have
responses from 20k web servers, 46% of which are (*,
443, HTTP/1.1) and 6% (*, 443, HTTP/2.0). The
top 10 web server response is at 5% for responses from
(*, 443, HTTP/1.1) web servers and at 34% for (*,
443, HTTP/2.0) web servers. Top 7 HTTP/2.0 web server
names by HTTP request count as reported by the web servers
and logged in HAR is ’sffe’: 16%, ”: 15%, ’cloudflare-
nginx’: 14%, ’cafe’: 14%, ’Golfe2’: 8%, ’adclick_server’: 6%,
’nginx’: 5%.
III. ESTIMATING HTTP RESPONSE SIZES
Our approach to estimate HTTP response sizes from TLS
records has two parts. In the first part we address the feature
in HTTP/1.1 and beyond that allows a TCP connection to
be reused for multiple requests. We segment the TLS records
of each TCP connection into sets of HTTP request-response
sequences that are contained entirely in each segment. Our
assumption in segmenting TCP connections is that the TLS
records of ready-to-send HTTP responses are sent back-to-
back. We look for gaps in the sequence of timestamps of these
records and use these gaps to segment the TCP connections.
In HTTP/1.1 a gap will exist between the timestamp of the
last TLS record of the current response and the timestampt
of the first TLS record of the next response. This gap is at
least one round trip time, as the client has to wait until the
the current response is completely received before sending the
next request. More generically in order to include pipelining
and response multiplexing are included, we take a gap in
the back-to-back TLS record sequences from the server as
indication that all requests sent by from the client and received
by the server up to that point have been served. We declare a
gap in the TCP connection when the difference between the
timestamps of consecutive TLS records from the server is 1)
larger than 0.5 seconds or 2) larger than 20 times the average
back-to-back response gap from the server, normalized to a
1500 byte TLS record size.
In the second part of our approach we analyze the sets
of HTTP request-response of the segmented TCP connections
to compute response sizes. The basic keep-alive model does
not consider pipelining and multiplexing and simply takes the
sum of all TLS record sizes from the server on each segment
of the TCP connection as an estimate of HTTP response
size. model that considers pipelining and multiplexing to
estimate HTTP response sizes relies on our intuition on the
following three side-channel information that leak from TLS.
1) HTTP/2.0 signaling is visible through small-sized TLS
records (less than 60 bytes) that indicate the beginning of
an HTTPS connection or the beginning or end of an HTTP
response. 2) Large HTTP responses generate back-to-back
TLS records with either network (∼ 1.5 kB) or TLS (∼ 16
kB) MTUs. 3) Request and response headers are sent in their
own TLS records, typically yielding record sizes smaller than
the MTU. We use this information to estimate the start and
finish times for HTTP requests and responses. With start and
finish times it is possible to identify segments in the TLS
record size sequences that contain entire responses that are
not multiplexed and others that are entirely or only partially
multiplexed. We sum all TLS record sizes to get an estimate of
non-multiplexed responses and ignore multiplexed responses.
What are the specific TLS record sizes that can be used to
determine start and finish times for requests and responses?
After manually inspecting the sequence of TLS record sizes
of the connections for the first few web site pages on Alexa’s
top web sites it is clear that the HTTP/2.0 data and signaling is
encapsulated differently for different web server implementa-
tions. We would like to group web servers in types according
to how they encapsulate HTTP/2.0 data and signaling. In
order to do so, we use the first one to three small (<100
bytes) TLS record sizes sent by the server at the beginning of
each HTTP/2.0 TCP connection and call this the web server
type sequence. We found 21k HTTP/2.0 TCP connections and
1252 unique HTTP/2.0 web server IP addresses in our dataset.
TLS handshaking has an application-layer protocol negotiation
(ALNP) extension in which the type of application data is sent
in clear text. We use this to establish if a TCP connection is
being used for HTTP/2.0 or not. We define HTTP/2.0 web
servers as a web server for which we can observe at least one
HTTP/2.0 TCP connection.
The first observation regarding types of web servers is that
all the connections to a given web server have the same initial
type sequence. The second observation is that the top five
type sequences account for more than 99% of the HTTP/2.0
TCP connections and over 89% of the HTTP/2.0 web servers.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of TCP connections and web
servers for the first five type sequences. For each web server
IP address found in the packet capture logs we find the
server reported names on the HAR logs. We also report this
information in Figure 1 together with a whois lookup for the
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TCP Connections
Web servers
Type 1: [51,37,33]
Type 2: [76,33,37]
Type 3: [64,33]
Type 4: [39,33,37]
Type 5: [76,33,41]
whois Reported names
Type 1 Google "ssfe", "", "HTTP server (unknown)",
"safe", "Golfe2", "cafe", "xbfe",
"GSE", "gws", ...
Type 2 Facebook "", "proxygen"
Type 3 Cloudflare, "cloudfare-nginx", "nginx", "",
Taobao, ... "Tengine", ...
Type 4 Twitter "tsa_f", ""
Type 5 Facebook "", "proxygen"
Figure 1. Percentage of HTTP/2.0 TCP connections and web servers per type (top).
Web server IP address whois lookup and web server names as reported to by server to
browser (bottom).
web servers IP addresses.
In this paper we focus on Type 1 servers that are responsible
for most of the HTTP/2.0 TCP connections in our data set.
Manual inspection of data from these servers allowed us to
define the following assumptions for our model.
• HTTP request and response headers are sent in TLS
records with sizes ranging from 70 to 350 bytes.
• 41 byte-length TLS records from the server indicate that
a response has finished.
The output of the estimation process is a list of sizes of
estimated responses from each web server per web page site
visited.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The algorithm that allows us to determined the number of
matched bytes and requests for each web server and each
visited web page site is as follows. First we define a matrix
with the byte difference between every estimated response and
every HAR response. We attempt to match smaller positive
entries in the matrix first. By requiring a positive entry we
are making sure that the estimated response is larger than
the HAR response. HAR response size is the size of the
compressed HTTP response, which should be equal to the
response size estimated from the TLS records or smaller if
any padding occurs at the TLS layer. For the smallest positive
entry we find at each iteration, we declare a match between
the estimated response corresponding to the entry’s row and to
the HAR response corresponding to the entry’s column, push
that match into a list, and set all entries in that row and column
of the matrix to ’NAN’. After the last iteration all entries in
the matrix should be ’NAN’. We then remove matches whose
difference between estimated response size and HAR response
size are 1) 15% or larger or 2) larger than 200 bytes.
The number of matched bytes and requests per web server
and per web page site is then used to compute two performance
metrics. These performance metrics are the ratio of matched
bytes to bytes in the HAR logs and the ratio of matched
responses to number of responses in the HAR logs. We
measure the performance of our estimation over the set of
requests that each HTTP/2.0 web server responds to when
each web site page is visited. We compare the performance
of our type 1 server model with that of the simple keep-alive
model using empirical cumulative distributions over the set of
<web server, web page site> tuples.
V. RESULTS
We obtained over 30k estimated HTTP/2.0 responses from
type 1 servers with an average of 2 HTTP/2.0 requests per
TCP connection. Over 9k out of the 30k estimated responses
were pipelined and not multiplexed. We also found 1.5k sets
of multiplexed responses corresponding to 4k out of 30k
HTTP/2.0 responses.
We observed 218 type 1 web servers in our estimated
HTTP/2.0 responses, out of which 140 provided more than
one pipelined response and 83 at least one set of multiplexed
responses. Figure 2 shows the per web server distribution
of responses normalized to the maximum response count for
total, pipelined, and multiplexed responses. The similarity
in the shape of these distributions suggests that although
less frequent, pipelining and multiplexing occurs in the same
proportion throughout the servers.
Figure 2. Comparing total, pipelined, and multiplexed per web server response
distribution.
We found 143 type 1 web servers in the HAR records of
our data set. These servers generated over 16.9k HTTP2/.0
responses. Out of these 16.9k responses, we found a match
for 8.8k responses with the basic keep-alive model and for
12.0k with type 1 server model. This corresponds to an overall
matching improvement of 3.3k responses. Regarding matched
bytes the results are similar: matched 240 MB with the keep-
alive model and 330 MB with the type 1 server model,
corresponding to a 90 MB improvement. Out of the 16.9k
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Figure 3. Comparison of keep-alive and type 1 server models.
responses, we have an improvement roughly from 50% to
70% matched responses with less than 15% and 200 bytes
TLS overhead.
What is the impact of pipelining in these improvements? We
found that 1) 3.9k type 1 matched responses were pipelined,
2) 3.7k pipelined responses had a match with type 1 model
and no match using the simple keep-alive model. This means
that 94% of the pipelined responses are new matches brought
in by the type 1 server model. The impact of multiplexing is
more difficult to ascertain as we do not estimate the size of
the responses only how many. A statistical dependency study
or a model for estimating multiplexed response sizes would
be required to understand such an impact.
Figure 3 shows an overall improvement in matched bytes
and requests for type 1 web server model compared to the
keep-alive model. In particular we observe a 21.6% to 3.8%
reduction of no matched bytes and no matched requests and a
22.4% to 44.1% increase of all matched bytes and all matched
requests when comparing the type 1 web server model to the
keep-alive model.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our conclusions from this experiment are as follows: 1)
the amount of pipelining observed is moderate (∼ 30%); 2)
the amount of multiplexing is small (∼ 13%); 3) the use of
TLS side-channel markers improves response matching; and
4) almost all pipelined responses could not be matched under
simple model and can be matched with improved model.
Our recommendation is to engage into effectively using
pipelining and request multiplexing, by limiting the effect
of TLS side-channel information and increasing response
multiplexing.
The main caveats of this work is whether these results hold
for more extensive web page site data set and for other types
of HTTP/2.0 web sites.
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